




Abstract. The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine’s
account of explication. Quine does not provide a general
account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does
not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides
working out Quine’s account of explication and explaining
this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such
as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I
relate Quinean explication to Carnap’s conception and argue
that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main
purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, philosophy has, once again, become conscious of its own
methods. One prominent question is whether our conceptual apparatus
is adequate or needs improvement. This investigation is often called
conceptual engineering (e.g. by Cappelen 2018) or conceptual ethics (e.g.
by Burgess & Plunkett 2013). Carnap’s notion of explication is regularly
cited as one root for such endeavours (e.g. Cappelen & Plunkett 2020,
6). A lot of research has focused on Carnap’s approach. But Quine also
proposes an account—which is the focus of this paper.
Given the amount of literature dedicated to Carnapian explication,
there is surprisingly little literature on Quine’s conception (a notable
exception is Gustafsson 2006, 2014). Usually, it is merely mentioned
that Quine’s conception is different/not different from Carnap’s, but not
investigated in any detail. Yet, some philosophers explicitly refer to
Quine’s account (e.g. Haslanger 2012, 367, n. 1) which necessitates a
better understanding.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general un-
derstanding of explication. Section 2.1 sketches Carnap’s account and
distinguishes between two notions of explication. Section 2.2 considers
how Quine relates his account to Carnap’s, introduces examples of expli-
cation, and suggests that Quine’s examples don’t fit his general account.
The rest of this paper also works towards resolving this puzzle.
Sections 3–5 contain Quine’s account of explication. Section 3 intro-
duces Quine’s paradigmatic account, Section 4 discusses Quine’s claim
that explication is elimination, and Section 5 relates explication to para-
phrase and provides adequacy criteria.
Sections 6 and 7 consider examples of explication and examples which
aren’t explications. This confirms our account, and suggests an answer
to the puzzle (Section 7.3).
Section 8 places explication within Quine’s argument for a set theory.
Section 9 concludes the paper by briefly comparing Quine’s and Car-
nap’s accounts.
2 Preliminaries on Explication
Let us start by introducing explication more generally. In Section 2.1,
we take a brief look at Carnap’s notions of explication, introduce some
terminology, and consider in what respects these notions differ from one
another. In Section 2.2, we consider how Quine relates his to Carnap’s
notion.
2.1 Carnap on Explication
Carnap’s understanding of ‘explication’ evolved over his career and can
be understood as development of his ‘rational reconstruction’ (Beaney
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2004, §4; cf. Carnap 1928/98, XVII). His most extensive discussion can
be found in his ‘Logical Foundations of Probability’ (1962, first published
1950; henceforth LFoP), but we can take his replies (1963b) in the Schilpp
volume (1963) as amendments to his earlier account (Brun 2016, 1213).
Carnap also uses explication in ‘Meaning and Necessity’ (1956, first pub-
lished 1947; henceforth M&N) without providing a detailed account.
Let us briefly consider Carnap’s (1962) understanding of explication.
The main idea is the following.
There is a certain term [. . . ] which is used in everyday language
and by scientists without being exactly defined, and we try to
make the use of these terms more precise or, as we shall say, to
give an explication for them. (1962, 2)
As such, Carnap’s account starts with terms which are supposed to be
made more precise; he goes over to speak of concepts, though:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or
less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the
first by the second. (1962, 3)
However, his view is not bound to concepts insofar as he also accepts to
explicate terms which are used to express these concepts (see 1962, 3). I
continue to speak of concepts in the following.
Carnap introduces the following terminology. He calls the concept that
is to be replaced explicandum whereas the replacing concept is called
explicatum. Quine calls the explicatum ‘explicans’ (1960, 259), but I
stick to ‘explicatum’ (without changing quotations).
Carnap’s M&N understanding of explication is, so far, virtually iden-
tical to the above:
The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept
used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical
development, or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed,
more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of
logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of
explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier concept[.]
(1956, 7f.)
There are two main differences between the accounts in M&N and LFoP.
The first is LFoP’s explicit demand to provide interpretations :
for a genuine explication [. . . ] an interpretation is essential. (1962,
16)
Carnap distinguishes two different steps when introducing concepts: ‘for-
malization and interpretation’ (1962, 15). For our purposes, formaliza-
tion is irrelevant; Carnap’s example is axiomatization (1962, 15f.).
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The interpretation, on the other hand, provides the formalised theory
with meaning. This can be accomplished in different ways, for example
by a definition (1962, 16).
Carnap’s reason to insist on an interpretation is that we want to be
able to use the explicatum in scientific contexts—we want to apply the
explicatum to the world, i.e., we need the explicatum ‘in the description
of facts’ (1962, 17). The example Carnap discusses is the explication of
natural numbers. He points out that within a purely formal system, we
can account for ‘formulas like “3 + 2 = 5” ’ (1962, 17), yet we are not
provided with an understanding of a numeral ‘when it occurs in a factual
sentence’ (1962, 18) such as in the sentence ‘the number of my fingers is
10’.
Carnap summarises this point as follows.
As soon as we go over from the field of formal mathematics to that
of knowledge about the facts of nature, in other words, to empirical
science, which includes applied mathematics, we need more than
a mere calculus or axiom system; an interpretation must be added
to the system. (1962, 18)
In other words, we need our explicatum to be applicable to the world.
One salient reason for the absence of an analogous requirement in
M&N is that Carnap provides a semantics for modal notions so that he
automatically provides interpretations when explicating certain notions
in semantic terms; there is simply no need in the context of M&N to
insist on interpretations.
The second main difference is that Carnap (1962, 7) introduces general
adequacy criteria for explications. The criteria are (i) similarity, (ii)
exactness, (iii) fruitfulness, and (iv) simplicity. For our purposes, we
don’t need to go into more detail.
I don’t want to speculate whether Carnap considered his M&N- and
LFoP-notions to be the same. In this context, we might also wonder
whether the formulation of particular conventions (e.g., Convention 2-1
in 1956, 10) which is prominent in explications in M&N is preserved in
the LFoP-explication. Of course, in the M&N description Carnap does
not insist on the formulation of conventions, but many of his explica-
tions happen to be accompanied by such.1 Carnap’s reason seems to be
that he only wants to make use of requirements stated in the conventions
(see 1956, 8), but not of any particular technical definition. Likewise, in
LFoP, Carnap does not rule out the explicit formulation of conventions,
but he doesn’t make it a requirement either. However, even in LFoP, he
1One reason might be that Carnap underwent his semantic turn after Tarski taught
him how to explicate ‘truth’ semantically (Carnap 1963a, §10; see also Leitgeb
& Carus 2021, §6.1 and Supplement F); Carnap might have modelled M&N-
explication along the lines of Tarski’s explication of truth: Tarski proposes his
Convention T (1933, 187f.) which any adequate definition of truth has to satisfy
(see 1933, 187); Carnap also refers to Tarski’s definition of ‘true’ (see his example
2 in 1962, 5).
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formulates ‘conventions of adequacy’ (e.g., C53-1 at 1962, 285). Since
explications are preceded by clarifying the explicanda (1962, 4), we can
understand such explicit conventions to belong to the clarification pro-
cess.
2.2 Quine on His and Carnap’s Conceptions
Let us consider how Quine relates his to Carnap’s account. After sketch-
ing it, Quine says the following.
Philosophical analysis, explication, has not always been seen in
this way. (1960, §53, p. 259)
To which he attaches the following footnote.
By Carnap, yes; see Meaning and Necessity, pp. 7f. (1960, 259, n.
4)
Quine refers to the second edition of M&N. Interestingly, Quine does not
mention (or list in the bibliography, see 1960, 278) Carnap’s LFoP. In
particular, Carnap’s M&N-notion of explication is, as outlined in Sec-
tion 2.1, presumably different from the one developed in LFoP. I don’t
want to speculate whether or not Quine knew about Carnap’s treatment
of explication in LFoP and, supposing that he did, whether he made a
conscious decision to only refer to M&N.2 However, Quine’s conception of
explication is similar to Carnap’s M&N conception. Given that Quine’s
examples of explication don’t fit his own paradigmatic account, one can
speculate that he was thinking of the M&N conception.
Nevertheless, Quine, in the paragraph leading to the above quotation,
explains his understanding of what an analysis or explication is, and he
goes on to refer to M&N, claiming that Carnap had the same under-
standing. We can take from this that Quine seems to think that his and
Carnap’s accounts agree at least on the spirit of explication.3
Besides the already cited footnote, Carnap is explicitly mentioned only
once more in §53, viz., in another footnote attached to a discussion of
the so-called paradox of analysis. The point Quine is making is that
the paradox of analysis arises from ‘the reading of a synonymy claim
into analysis’ (1960, 259) and refers in the footnote to Carnap’s M&N-
discussion of it.
This is all Quine does to relate his to Carnap’s account, and the first
cited footnote is the reason for interpreters to understand Quine as giving
the same account as Carnap. However, all we can infer from it is that
2We can assume, though, that Quine knew LFoP; he refers to its first edition (1951,
23, n. 4).
3Gustafsson’s interpretation (of the footnote) is that Quine ‘suggests that with re-
gard to explication, he and Carnap endorse basically the same methodological
viewpoint’ (2014, 508).
6
Quine on Explication June 29, 2021 2.2 Quine on His & Carnap’s Conceptions
Quine takes Carnap to have a similar attitude towards analysis and ex-
plication: the explicatum is allowed to be different from the explicandum
as long as it is capable of fulfilling the particular purpose which made it
worth troubling about (1960, 258f.). In Carnap’s words:
Generally speaking, it is not required that an explicatum have,
as nearly as possible, the same meaning as the explicandum; it
should, however, correspond to the explicandum in such a way
that it can be used instead of the latter. (1956, 8)
This alone is the agreement Quine diagnoses between Carnap’s and his
own understanding without any suggestion of further agreement. Thus,
for the moment, we can leave it open how closely matched Quine saw
Carnap’s M&N-account and his own.
This brings us to the examples Quine lists as instances of explication.
They are the following (1960, 260f.):
(Example 1) the ordered pair,
(Example 2) singular descriptions,4
(Example 3) indicative conditionals,
(Example 4) quantifiers.
The context of the discussion is Quine’s claim that explication helps us
to dissolve particular ‘philosophical’ problems. Quine does not explic-
itly call (Example 2)–(Example 4) explications, but his discussion of
explication starts with (Example 1) before he calls it ‘paradigmatic of
what we are most typically up to when in a philosophical spirit we offer
an “analysis” or “explication” ’ (1960, 258), and the sentence leading to
the text containing the above list of examples is the following.
But what it illustrates as to the nature of explication applies very
widely. (1960, 260)
Hence, Quine takes these to be examples of successful explication.
However, Quine does not discuss (Example 2)–(Example 4); he only
presents his treatment of ‘ordered pair’. In particular, he calls, as I just
quoted above, his construction of ‘ordered pair’ ‘paradigmatic’ (1960,
258). I take it that this means that we can and have to generalise on this
particular ‘construction’ (1960, 258). Quine is also explicit:
4Gustafsson claims to have shown ‘that at least some such instances of paraphrasing
(such as Russell’s way with singular descriptions) are counted as explications by
Quine’ (2014, 523). Even though I can’t find an explicit argument, he at least
recognises that Quine claims that his treatment of singular descriptions is an
instance of explication. Gustafsson also recognises the tension (2014, 518) to the
paradigmatic account to explicate nouns (2014, 522), but still claims that singular
descriptions are an explication example.
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Our example is atypical in just one respect: the demands of partial
agreement are preternaturally succinct and explicit (1960, 259)
where he sums up these demands in (what I call) a purpose postulate
(viz., (OpPp); see Section 3.3). Thus, we might not always expect to
get such a succinct and explicit postulate, but the treatment is otherwise
the same in other cases of explication. Moreover, Quine also tells us the
following.
The ordered pair has had illustrative value because of the crispness
of [its purpose postulate] and because of the multiplicity and the
conspicuous artificiality of the explications. But what it illustrates
as to the nature of explication applies very widely. (1960, 260)
Directly following is the above list of examples. Indeed, the examples are
supposed to show how widely applicable explication is. This confirms
that (i) the examples are indeed examples of successful explication and
(ii) the account of ‘ordered pair’ generalises.
What is astonishing about this is that (Example 2)–(Example 4)
do not fit the account of (Example 1). One reason is quite simply that
Quine explicates what he calls ‘defective nouns’ (1960, 257), but none of
(Example 2)–(Example 4) is even a noun.
3 The Paradigmatic Account
This brings us to the details of Quine’s account as developed in §53
of ‘Word and Object’ (henceforth W&O). In Section 3.1, I provide a
brief sketch of Quine’s account so that the following discussion has a
clear target. Section 3.2 gives an account of what defective nouns—the
explicanda—are, and Section 3.3 presents the paradigmatic construction
of ‘ordered pair’.
3.1 A Sketch of Quinean Explication
As presented in §53 of W&O, Quinean explication (or simply explica-
tion) relates (particular) natural language expressions and expressions
of a theory formulated in canonical notation.5 What the explication is
supposed to do is to find adequate surrogates for what Quine calls ‘de-
fective nouns’ (Section 3.2);6 and such surrogates depend on the theory
into which we explicate—explication is theory relative. However, not ev-
ery defective noun needs to be explicated, but only those which have a
5For the rest of this paper, ‘explication’ without qualification means Quinean expli-
cation. Thanks to an anonymous referee for making me be explicit here.
6This contrasts Quinean and Carnapian explication. Carnapian explication is itera-
tive, i.e., some explicata might, in turn, serve as explicanda. This is impossible for
Quinean explication, because his explicata are formulated in canonical notation
and, therefore, are neither expressions of natural language nor defective.
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useful purpose. The particular purposes of a defective noun are collected
in purpose postulates which are adequacy criteria for the explicata of
the respective defective nouns. This means that explication is, just like
Carnapian explication, a two step process. In the first step, we find pur-
pose postulates; this step corresponds to Carnap’s clarification step. The
second step consists in finding an appropriate surrogate for a particular
theory.
Therefore, a theory T successfully explicates a defective noun N with
purpose postulates PP1[N ], . . . , PPn[N ] of N (n ∈ N) iff there is a
T -surrogate S for N (i.e., N(x) :⇔ S(x) where S ∈ LT ) such that
T ` ∃xS(x) so that T `
∧n
i=1 PPi[N/S] (where PPj[N/S] is the result
of substituting S everywhere for N in PPj). This means that a success-
ful explication comes with ontological commitments, but the ontological
commitments are not new ones (cf. Gustafsson 2006, 62), but we find
part of the ontology of T capable of fulfilling the purpose postulates.
Thus, even though T ` ∃xS(x), explication does not come with addi-
tional commitments but just provides a T -surrogate for N ; the role of
the ontological commitment is to guarantee that the purpose postulates
are non-trivially fulfilled.
3.2 Defective Nouns, Identity, and Ontological
Commitment
As sketched in Section 3.1, the starting point of an explication is a defec-
tive noun. The purpose of this section is to clarify what defective nouns
are, and, in particular, why they are defective.
The opening lines of W&O’s §53 are as follows.
A pattern repeatedly illustrated in recent sections is that of the
defective noun that proves undeserving of objects and is dismissed
as an irreferential fragment of a few containing phrases. But some-
times a defective noun fares oppositely: its utility is found to turn
on the admission of denoted objects as values of the variables of
quantification. In such a case our job is to devise interpretations
for it in the term positions where, in its defectiveness, it had not
used to occur. (1960, 257)
The sections leading to §53 are entitled ‘Entia non grata’ (§50), ‘Limit
myths’ (§51), and ‘Geometrical objects’ (§52), and are what Quine refers
to with ‘recent sections’. In these sections, he dispenses with several
nouns; we come back this.
The quotation indicates a reason to dispense with these defective nouns,
viz., they are ‘undeserving of objects’ and ‘irreferential’. What Quine is
getting at is that these nouns appear as if they come with ontological
commitment, but not in every occurrence. Indeed, the phrase ‘values of
the variables of quantification’ builds a strong connection to ontological
commitment.
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This also points us into the direction of an adequate understanding of
why certain nouns are defective. One example is Quine’s paradigmatic
example, i.e., ordered pair ; it is the first example of a useful defective
noun. The previous sections, on the other hand, contain examples of
defective nouns not worth explicating. Quine explicitly calls some nouns
defective in §50:
Units of measure turn out somewhat like sakes and behalves.
‘Mile’, ‘minute’, ‘degree Fahrenheit’, and the like resemble ‘sake’
and ‘behalf’ in being defective nouns: they are normally used only
in a limited selection of the usual term positions. (1960, 244, his
emphasis)
Thus, ‘mile’, ‘minute’, ‘degree Fahrenheit’, ‘sake’, and ‘behalf’ are de-
fective nouns; further examples are ‘possible concrete objects’ and ‘un-
actualized possibles’ (1960, 245). Quine also provides a reason for their
defectiveness: ‘there is perplexity over identity’ (1960, 245), i.e., defective
nouns don’t have proper identity conditions or, as Quine also puts it, the
source of their defectiveness is ‘the lack of standard of identity’ (1960,
244). This can easily be seen by exposing them ‘in absurd interrogation’
(1960, 244) by asking, for example, whether different miles are alike or
how many sakes there are.
The main problem is that they sometimes occur in ‘the usual term
positions’, i.e., they sometimes appear as though they had entities cor-
responding to them. Indeed, it is the term position that gives rise to
ontological commitment. However, Quine demands of any entity that it
has identity conditions; in slogan form, this becomes his infamous ‘no en-
tity without identity’ (1957/58, 23). In particular, then, such defective
nouns sometimes behave as if they were terms, i.e., ontologically com-
mitting, but sometimes they don’t. Quine’s only explanation of their
defectiveness is that ‘they are normally used only in a limited selection
of the usual term positions’. His general strategy to deal with such terms
is to paraphrase them (see Section 5).
As this is important in the following, let us briefly consider Quinean
ontological commitment by just stating relevant features. Most impor-
tantly, it is exclusively sentences formulated in canonical notation, i.e., a
first-order language (with identity),7 which give rise to ontological com-
mitments (e.g., 1948, 31f.), and the ontologically committing mechanism
is quantification (e.g., 1953, 105, 1968, 97). In particular, it is the bound
variables which have to take values, and the values over which these vari-
ables range is the universe consisting of the objects which have to figure
as values. Indeed, Quine explicitly says that it is ‘the object designated
by [. . . ] a term that counts as a value of the variable’ (1960, §40, p. 192,
n. 1). As it is the quantifiers that bind variables, and it is the existential
quantifier that positively asserts the existence of something, a theory T
7See Hylton (2007, ch. 10, §I) for a more detailed description.
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is ontologically committed to ϕs iff T ` ∃xϕ, i.e., iff T implies that ϕs
exist.8 This understanding suffices for our purposes.
3.3 The Ordered Pair
Let us consider, then, why some of the defective nouns can (or even: need
to) be explicated.
As mentioned before, the example Quine discusses is ‘ordered pair’
(Example 1).9 As the beginning of §53 (first quotation of Section 3.2)
makes clear, some nouns are useful—indeed, they are so useful as to
admit corresponding objects. As we have just seen, that means that
these nouns have to be connected to ontological commitment so that it
becomes necessary to admit corresponding objects.
Before following up on ontological commitment, let us consider why
some defective nouns are useful. Why is ‘ordered pair’ a useful notion?
Quine identifies its utility as follows.
A typical use of the device is in assimilating relations to classes,
by taking them as classes of ordered pairs. (1960, 257)
That is, we can use ordered pairs as device to ‘assimilate relations to
classes’, i.e., in a sense, we can reduce our treatment of relations to that
of classes, because an ordered pair is a ‘single object doing the work of
two’ (1960, 258). As such, Quine (1960, 258) formulates the following
postulate:
(OpPp) If 〈x, y〉 = 〈z, w〉, then x = z and y = w.
Here, ‘〈x, y〉’ is the ordered pair of ‘x’ and ‘y’. As one entity, ‘〈x, y〉’ is
doing the job of two because it’s doing the jobs of both x and y as well
as figuring as entity itself. The postulate (OpPp) ensures this.
I call postulates like (OpPp) purpose postulates. In the case of ordered
pair, one postulate suffices; in the general case, there can be any number
of purpose postulates. The purpose postulates capture the useful part of
the respective defective nouns. Formulating the purpose postulates corre-
sponds to Carnap’s clarification process which precedes the construction
of an explicatum.
The ordered pair is distinct from an unordered pair insofar as we can
distinguish its elements via their order. For example, ‘〈x, y〉’ has as its
first element ‘x’ and as its second ‘y’. They are only then not distinct if
they are the same entity, i.e., 〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉 iff x = y; otherwise, order
makes a difference.
8See Chihara (1968, 1973, §III.3, 1974) for discussion.
9An anonymous referee objected that ‘ordered pair’ is not defective. However, Quine
does classify ‘ordered pair’ as defective noun; see the beginning of §53 of W&O
where he briefly discusses Pierce’s account. From today’s perspective, this is diffi-
cult to understand as we have settled on what here turns out to be the explicatum,
i.e., our current understanding is the end-product of an explication (not necessarily
a Quinean, though).
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Different ways to account for ordered pairs have been proposed. Quine
(1960, 259) discusses Wiener’s original proposal to identify the ordered
pair 〈x, y〉 with the set {{x}, {y, ∅}} where ‘∅’ denotes the empty set,
i.e., the set which has no members.10 Kuratowski, on the other hand,
identifies the ordered pair 〈x, y〉 with a different set: {{x}, {x, y}}.11
Given that we have different options, we can wonder whether one ex-
plication is better than another and, in particular, whether there is one
that is correct. Before engaging with this question, let us consider what
Quine says about explication more generally. Following the explication
of ‘ordered pair’, Quine explains his understanding of ‘explication’ as
‘supplying lacks’:
We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression that
make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear
and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions.
(1960, 258f.)
Indeed, as long as the functions are preserved, the explication can be
taken to be successful. Quine emphasises that it is important that there
is no synonymy claim (1960, 258): explicandum and explicatum need
not be synonymous (cf. Carnap 1956, 8). Connecting this explicitly to
paraphrase (W&O §53: 259 refers to §38), Quine says:
A paraphrase into a canonical notation is good insofar as it tends
to meet needs for which the original might be wanted. (1960, §38,
p. 182)
Quine goes on to point out that a paraphrase is allowed to close truth-
value gaps (1960, 182). He calls such changes ‘don’t-cares’ (1960, 182);
more on that in Section 5.
As we noted that explication comes with ontological commitment, the
‘don’t-cares’ provide us with a certain freedom as to with what entities
we choose to ‘fill those functions’.12 Both Wiener’s and Kuratowski’s
explications are presupposing sets, and both guarantee (OpPp) to be
non-vacuously true due to the commitment to sets. These explications
are both possible as long as sets are ‘terms to our liking’. In particu-
lar, then, the theory into which we explicate was already ontologically
committed to these entities playing the role of the explicatum. As Quine
makes explicit in the case of ‘ordered pair’:
The problem of suitably eking out the use of these defective nouns
can be solved once for all by systematically fixing upon some suit-
able already-recognized object, for each x and y, with which to
identify 〈x, y〉. (1960, 258, my emphases)
10Note that, as Gustafsson (2006, 61, n. 2) points out, this account is not entirely
accurate as Wiener was working within Russellian type theory.
11The proposals diverge if x 6= ∅ since {{x}, {x, y}} = {{x}, {y, ∅}} iff x = ∅.
12An example of a ‘don’t-care’ for Wiener’s proposal is that ∅ ∈
⋃
〈x, y〉 (= {x, y, ∅})
for any ordered pair 〈x, y〉 whereas this is not the case for Kuratowski’s proposal.
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To continue the above examples, we might have already been ontologi-
cally committed to sets before we explicated ordered pairs as particular
sets (cf. Section 8). In any case, it is necessary to be ontologically com-
mitted to something for the explication to be successful because these
entities are supposed to guarantee the purpose postulates to be non-
vacuously satisfied.13
This also shows that explication is a theory-relative notion. The rea-
son is simply that we need a theory in order to make sense of even
having ‘some suitable already-recognized object’ which can serve as the
explicandum’s surrogate. In both Wiener’s and Kuratowski’s accounts
of ordered pair this is certainly true since we presuppose a set theory in
the background which is then capable of proving (OpPp); in particular,
the ontological commitment to sets means that (OpPp) is not vacuously
true.
4 Explication is Elimination
As argued above, an explication actually comes with ontological com-
mitments. However, Quine also claims that ‘explication is elimination’
(1960, §53, p. 260), though ‘not all elimination is explication’ (1960, 261).
As Gustafsson (2006, 2014) argues, Quine takes explications to eliminate
ontological commitments.14 We need an understanding of elimination
that resolves the tension between the ontological commitment of an ex-
plication that is necessary for the explication to be adequate, and the
idea that we eliminate ontological commitment; the discussion shows
that Gustafsson’s interpretation isn’t entirely correct.
The obvious suggestion is that any explication of ‘ordered pair’ elimi-
nates ordered pairs. Quine puts it like this:
In the case of the ordered pair the initial philosophical problem,
summed up in the question ‘What is an ordered pair?’, is dissolved
by showing how we can dispense with ordered pairs in any prob-
lematic sense in favor of certain clearer notions. (1960, §53, p.
260, my emphasis)
However, since we explicate defective nouns, and defective nouns are
defective because of their problematic identity conditions (Section 3.2; cf.
Gustafsson 2006, 63f.), this cannot lead to the elimination of ontological
commitments : ontological commitment only arises in canonical notation
13Cf. what Quine says regarding ideal objects (see Section 7.1): ‘The appeal to
ideal objects in mechanics occurs regularly through universal conditionals: thus
(x)(if x is a mass point then . . . ). The nonexistence of ideal objects consequently
does not falsify mechanics; it leaves such sentences vacuously true for lack of
counter-instances” (1960, §51, p. 249). Quine goes on to reject this option.
14To be more precise, Gustafsson (2006, 58, 2014, 520) argues that we eliminate
ontological commitment because the explication puts us into a position to adopt
an equivalent theory not ontologically committed to the explicandum.
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which cannot be defective. Thus, we just don’t have entities or ontological
commitment that we could eliminate by explicating. Therefore, we need
a different account of elimination.
Let us consider in what way Quine draws the distinction between elim-
ination and explication:
Explication is elimination but not all elimination is explication.
Showing how the useful purposes of some perplexing expression
can be accomplished through new channels would seem to count
as explication just in case the new channels parallel the old ones
sufficiently for there to be a striking if partial parallelism of func-
tion between the old troublesome form of expression and some
form of expression figuring in the new method. In this case we are
likely to view the latter form of expression as an explicans of the
old, and, if it is longer, even abbreviate it by the old word. (1960,
§53, p. 261)
This suggests that there has to be a similarity constraint in place in order
for something to be an explication and not just to be an elimination.
Without such similarity, i.e., if the ‘new channels’ are not ‘parallel’ to
the old ones, we have a case of elimination without explication. The
passage continues as follows:
If there was a question of objects, and the partial parallelism which
we are now picturing obtains, the corresponding objects of the
new scheme will tend to be looked upon as the old mysterious
objects minus the mystery. Clearly this is merely a way of phrasing
matters, and wrong only as it threatens the immunity of the don’t-
cares and suggests that one of two divergent explicantia must be
wrong. (1960, 261)
This passage gets us closer to the question in what cases an explication
is ‘correct’, which we consider in Section 5. For the current discussion,
the remark about the ‘don’t-cares’ is more relevant.
Besides a similarity requirement, the passages do not tell us much
about why certain cases are only cases of elimination and not also of
explication. In particular, Quine’s ‘don’t-cares’ seem to pull into another
direction as the last quotation also suggests. His requirement for suc-
cessful explication is simply that the explication preserves the functions
singled out as purposeful. This means, in particular, that the explication
has to lead to ontological commitments as we do need entities to fulfil
the functions. Anything beyond that is declared a ‘don’t-care’.
To get clearer about what is going on, let us reconsider how Quine
introduces the topic of explication. As we have seen in Section 3.2,
Quine distinguishes between useful and useless defective nouns, and it is
the useful which are the target of explications.
The contrast drawn at the beginning of this section, between the
defective noun whose objects we dispense with and the defective
14
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noun whose defectiveness we are at pains to eke out so as to keep
the objects, can then be put more simply: it is just a matter of
whether the ostensible objects of the defective noun played roles
that still want playing by some sort of object. (1960, §53, pp. 261f.,
my emphases)
The most interesting part is that Quine tells us explicitly that the explica-
tion wants to ‘keep the objects’.15 What this shows is that Quine’s claim
that explication is elimination does not get rid of part of the ontology.
What it does is to eliminate a ‘troublesome form of expression’. Explica-
tion, for Quine, is not about ontology per se (though see Section 8). The
problem is that certain nouns fulfil functions that need to be fulfilled.
Insofar as the nouns are defective they sometimes, but not always, occur
in places in which they enforce corresponding objects. And in such places
they appear to be ontologically committing. However, they don’t have
clear identity criteria because they also occur in different places—and in
such places they might be pictured as ‘mysterious objects’. Quine’s point
is that if we were to admit these nouns into our regimented theories, they
would come with ontological commitment to mysterious entities. And it
is these entities we can be said to eliminate. Nonetheless, this is just
‘a way of phrasing matters’. As his slogan ‘no entity without identity’
suggests, there just aren’t such entities. So, in particular, there is no
way to eliminate them. What we eliminate are expressions which are
troublesome insofar as they would give rise to such non-entities.
What we rather want is to provide surrogates in our already regimented
theory—and it is only in the context of a regimented theory that talk
of ontological commitment (and an ontology) makes even sense. Which
particular objects we single out for the job of the defective nouns is
what Quine calls a ‘don’t-care’; it does not matter as long as the job
is done. And the guarantee that the job is done is by showing that
the theory into which we explicate (non-trivially) proves the respective
purpose postulates. What we were interested in, in the first place, was
just the purpose of the defective noun. Explication is Quine’s way of
showing that such purposes are fulfilled—and part of that is to formalise
the natural language expressions, i.e., to paraphrase them.
5 Paraphrase, Explication, and Adequacy
Criteria
The main goal of this section is to work out Quine’s adequacy criteria for
explication. In order to do so, we have to consider explication in the light
of paraphrase; I argue that explication is a particular kind of paraphrase.
(Gustafsson understands Quine’s treatment of, e.g., singular descrip-
tions as paraphrases and observes that ‘it is somewhat difficult to say
15This point is commonly missed; e.g., it is completely absent in Hylton’s exposition
(2007, ch. 9, §III).
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to what extent Quine counts such paraphrasing as a matter of expli-
cation’ (2014, 518). He realises the tension between Quine’s paradigm
(Example 1) and, e.g., (Example 2) (2014, 518), but still claims that
(Example 2) is a Quinean explication—with which I disagree. Even
though there is much to agree with in Gustafsson 2014, I think he misses
some key features of Quinean explication. This section helps resolving
this issue.)
As is well-known, Quine is a champion of paraphrase strategies. How-
ever, paraphrase strategies are poorly understood (von Solodkoff 2014,
571) and, to make things worse, there are several uses of ‘paraphrase’
even if we exclusively consider W&O; see Table 1 (p. 17).16
Of course, some of these uses might amount to the same, but some are
clearly distinct. I won’t discuss them in any detail, but it is important to
appreciate how diverse the uses of ‘paraphrase’ in Quine are. Similarly,
Kuhn has been criticised by Margaret Masterman (1970, 61) that he uses
‘paradigm’ in 21 different senses in ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions’ (2012, first published 1962). I think it is clear, but I won’t spell it
out, that Quine should, likewise, be criticised for his uses of ‘paraphrase’.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, Quine relates explication to paraphrase:
Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our in-
terests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the
head of ‘don’t-cares’ (§38). (1960, §53, p. 259)
The title of §38 is ‘Conciliatory remarks. Elimination of singular terms’
which is part of chapter V called ‘Regimentation’. As its title suggests,
§38 contains Quine’s treatment of singular terms. In particular, Quine
proposes a procedure for the ‘reparsing of names as general terms’ (1960,
182) which might well lead to the ‘closing of truth-value gaps’ (1960,
182). Let me fully quote what Quine goes on to say.
But this was a purpose of the reparsing. It would have been wrong
if paraphrase carried a synonymy claim; but it does not (§33). A
paraphrase into a canonical notation is good insofar as it tends
to meet needs for which the original might be wanted. If the
form of paraphrase happens incidentally to produce sense where
the original suffered a truth-value gap and so was wanted for no
purpose, we may just let the added cases turn out as they will.
[. . . ] Such waste cases, what the computing-machine engineers
call don’t-cares, are a frequent feature of good paraphrases, as we
shall have further occasion to note. (1960, 182)
16As noted by Szabó, Quine ‘is often rather elusive on what he means by paraphrase’
(2003, 21, n. 20). Szabó claims to find six uses in Quine’s (1948). However,
the word ‘paraphrase’ only occurs twice in Quine (1948) so that we have to look
elsewhere to substantiate Szabó’s observation.
Furthermore, Gibson (1982, §3.5.1.2) comes close to a similar point as mine
when he distinguishes between explication and what he calls ‘simple paraphrase’.
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(Use 1) translating (§16: 73, §49: 243)
(Use 2) avoiding plurals (§19: 90, §24: 118, §36: 174ff.)
(Use 3) saving communication from failing (§26: 125)
(i) resolving ambiguity (§27: 129, §33: 157, 159)
(ii) disambiguating scope ambiguities (§29: 138)
(Use 4) banishing/dispensing with locutions (§30: 144, §40:
191, §45: 221, §50: 248)
(Use 5) exposing two-role subjects (§32: 153)
(Use 6) explaining functions/uses of opaque verbs (§32: 154,
155)
(Use 7) exposing grammatical form (§32: 156)
(Use 8) accounting for non-referential position/bringing out
the distinction between referential and non-referential
positions (§32: 156)
(Use 9) exposing structure/gaining clarity of structure (§32:
156, §40: 191)
(Use 10) formalizing into canonical notation (§33: 159, 160f.,
§36: 175, §38: 182, §46: 225, §49: 242)
(Use 11) simplifying/regimenting theory (§34: 162, 163, 165,
§40: 191, §46: 224, §51: 250)
(Use 12) eliminating singular terms/singular descriptions (§37:
179, §38: 182f., 184)
(Use 13) philosophical analysis (§43: 206, 208, §53: 258)
(Use 14) reducing to a single term (§47: 232)
(Use 15) making ontic content explicit (§49: 242)
(Use 16) definition (§51: 250)
(Use 17) coordinating uses of diverse theories (§51: 250)
(Use 18) eliminating reference (§52: 254)
(Use 19) explication (§52: 253f., §53: 258, §54: 263f.)
Table 1: Uses of ‘Paraphrase’ in W&O
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Before focusing on the adequacy criteria suggested in this quotation, let
us consider the ‘don’t-cares’. The quotation is the first of six occurrences
of this expression. Four of those six occurrences are contained in §53; the
remaining one occurs in §47 referring to §38.
In the quotation, Quine tells us what he calls ‘don’t-cares’, viz., ‘waste
cases’ which don’t have a purpose. As such cases don’t have a purpose,
Quine feels free to let them ‘turn out as they will’ since it doesn’t make
a difference. Besides that, Quine insists in §47 that they are ‘a major
source of simplicity of theory’ (1960, 229), i.e., admitting don’t-cares
leads to simpler theories. For example, we can admit intuitively mean-
ingless sentences such as Russell’s ‘Quadruplicity drinks procrastination’
(Quine 1960, 229) and treat them as false, instead of meaningless. This
simplifies our notion of sentence insofar as we do not have to distinguish
between meaningful and meaningless constructions.
This also ties in with other uses of paraphrase, viz., ‘paraphrasing into
canonical notation’ (Use 10), ‘simplifying/regimenting theory’ (Use 11),
and ‘eliminating singular terms’ (Use 12). Indeed, (Use 12) is, as its
title suggests, the point of §38. What the quotation above tells us is that
don’t-cares are ‘a frequent feature of good paraphrases’, because it allows
us to simplify our theories. Furthermore, the quotation also tell us that
paraphrased and paraphrase need not be synonymous.
More to the point, we noted that §53 refers to §38. Quine does not
explicitly say that explications are paraphrases, but the similarities are
striking. Neither explication nor paraphrase need to preserve synonymy,
and both come with don’t-cares. Moreover, explication is a purpose-
driven notion since it comes with purpose postulates. The above quo-
tation, too, speaks of the purposes of what’s being paraphrased. And,
crucially, paraphrase also connects to elimination (Use 12). (Section 6.2
further corroborates the claim ‘explication is paraphrase’.)
Therefore, insofar as explication is reducible to paraphrase, providing
adequacy criteria for paraphrase also provides adequacy criteria for ex-
plication. Of course, as every explication is a paraphrase, but not vice
versa (as, e.g., (Use 2) witnesses), we are free to place additional ade-
quacy criteria on explication; indeed, that is what we have done with the
purpose postulates. Considering whether the Wiener- or the Kuratowski-
definition of ‘ordered pair’ are correct, Quine says the following:
Which is right? All are; all fulfill [(OpPp)], and conflict with one
another only out among the don’t-cares. (1960, §53, p. 260)
Thus, an explication is adequate as long as it guarantees the explanan-
dum’s purpose postulates. We have also seen that this enforces onto-
logical commitment to the respective explicata in order for the purpose
postulates to be non-vacuously true in the theory.
Moreover, as the potential explications conflict with respect to the
don’t-cares, and Quine refers that discussion to §38, i.e., back to para-
phrase, we can see again that explication is a kind of paraphrase.
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Therefore, we have to consider the adequacy criteria for paraphrase—
or, more precisely, the adequacy criteria for the relevant use of para-
phrase. The relevant use in §38 is (Use 12). The purpose of §38 is to
show how to paraphrase singular terms into canonical notation (Use 10)
so that variables are the only remaining singular terms (1960, 185). The
displayed quotation already suggests an adequacy criterion:
A paraphrase into a canonical notation is good insofar as it tends
to meet needs for which the original might be wanted. (1960, 182)
In this respect, Quine insists that there is no ‘synonymy claim’ and refers
to §33 entitled ‘Aims and claims of regimentation’. One immediate up-
shot of dismissing synonymy is that Quine’s dismissive attitude towards
closing truth-value gaps is somewhat justified—another feature of both
paraphrase (§38) and explication (§53).
The phrasing of the criterion also relates to purposes; a paraphrase
is good insofar as it serves its purposes. This raises the questions (i)
whose purposes we are talking about and (ii) who judges whether they
are served.
To answer these questions, we have to consider what paraphrase in
this sense is supposed to accomplished. In §33, Quine tells us that it is
simplification:
It is the part of strategy to keep theory simple where we can, and
then, when we want to apply the theory to particular sentences of
ordinary language, to transform those sentences into a ‘canonical
form’ adapted to the theory. (1960, 158)
Quine claims that this is ‘the best division of labor’ between ‘theoretical
deduction’ and ‘paraphrasing ordinary language into the theory’ (1960,
159). Of course, the paraphrase depends on the theory, and the theory
depends on a theorist—and only the theorist is in a position to judge the
adequacy of the paraphrase:
For normally he himself is the one who has uttered, as part of
some present job, the sentence of ordinary language concerned;
and he can then judge outright whether his ends are served by the
paraphrase. (1960, 159)
In order for the theorist to judge this, s/he has to know the purposes
of what s/he uttered in ordinary language. These purposes are also not
fixed once and for all, but they are allowed to change (1960, 160)—also
and even in light of potential paraphrases. Crucially, this job has to be
done by the theorists themselves:
We cannot paraphrase our opponent’s sentences into canonical
notation for him and convict him of the consequences, for there is
no synonymy; rather we must ask him what canonical sentences
he is prepared to offer, consonantly with his own inadequately
expressed purposes. (1960, §49, pp. 242f.)
19
Quine on Explication June 29, 2021 5 Paraphrase, Explication, and Adequacy
Thus, the only one in a position to judge the adequacy is whoever does
the paraphrasing.
This, then, answers our above questions: it is the theorist who asserts
a sentence within ordinary language whose purposes are relevant, and
it is the theorist him-/herself who judges whether the purposes have
been served by the paraphrase. Insofar as we are capable of rephrasing
our sentences to avoid/resolve ambiguity within ordinary language (cf.
(Use 3)), we are also capable of providing paraphrases into canonical
notation, because canonical notation is a special part of (semi-)ordinary
language (1960, §33, p. 159). In particular, we are allowed to make
changes; indeed, we also have to make changes if we want to avoid/resolve
ambiguities. Given that we are in a situation in which we need to do so, if
the paraphrase didn’t differ from the paraphrased, then we wouldn’t have
avoided/resolved the ambiguity, i.e., the very purpose of paraphrasing
would not be fulfilled. This is Quine’s reason to dismiss synonymy.17
Relating this back to explication, we can see again that explication is
a kind of paraphrase. As paraphrases come with purposes, explications
are special only insofar as we formulate explicit purpose postulates. As
argued above, explication is a theory relative notion, i.e., only after we
fixed a theory can we judge the success of an explication. This is different
from other kinds of paraphrase; indeed, one use of paraphrase, viz., (Use
11), is regimenting in order to get to a theory. Whether the particular
paraphrase is adequate can therefore not be judged with respect to a yet
to be established theory.
Furthermore, paraphrase is not always elimination. Quine is also ex-
plicit about this when he says that ‘[n]one of the eliminations of singular
terms in §§37 and 38 eliminated objects’ (1960, §40, p. 192) and, clearly,
paraphrase doesn’t eliminate (defective) notions. Nevertheless, the fea-
tures of explication which we have worked out (Section 3) arise from the
corresponding features of paraphrase.
The striking difference between paraphrase and explication is, then,
the adequacy requirement of explication that enforces ontological com-
mitment to something. Of course, one use of ‘paraphrase’, viz., (Use
15), is closely connected:
To paraphrase a sentence into the canonical notation of quantifica-
tion is, first and foremost, to make its ontic content explicit, quan-
tification being a device for talking in general of objects. (1960,
§49, p. 242)
Nevertheless, ontological commitment cannot be, in general, an adequacy
criterion of paraphrase.
17Quine presents this argument at least twice: §33 (p. 159) to dismiss the synonymy
claim for paraphrase and in §53 (p. 259) to dismiss the synonymy claim for ex-
plication. As the discussion of the text makes obvious, the argument reduces to
the claim that synonymy cannot be an adequacy criterion for (Use 3) because it
inhibits disambiguation.
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6 Explication Examples
Let us consider some examples of explication: natural numbers (Sec-
tion 6.1) and mind (Section 6.2). Besides illustrating the account, the
examples also corroborate the claim that explication is (a kind of) para-
phrase.
6.1 Explication Example 1: (Natural) Numbers
Quine’s first explication example is ‘number’ (§54) which is a straightfor-
ward and clear-cut instance. To show that, we have to formulate purpose
postulates and show how the relevant theory proves them.
The background theory is, as it was in the case of ‘ordered pair’, a
set theory (we don’t need to be more specific here; note that Quine calls
what I call ‘sets’ ‘classes’). Regarding the purpose postulates, Quine tells
us the following:
The condition upon all acceptable explications of number (that is,
of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . ) can be put almost as succinctly
as [(OpPp)] of §53: any progression—i.e., any infinite series each of
whose members has only finitely many precursors—will do nicely.
(1960, 262)
That means that we get a succinct formulation analogous to the one of
‘ordered pair’:
(NnPp) (Natural) numbers form a progression.
Just as in the case of ‘ordered pair’, several explications are possible
and acceptable. Quine considers Frege’s, von Neumann’s, and Zermelo’s
definitions and notices that the entities required by the definitions are
all present in our universe of values of variables [. . . ], and available
for selective use as convenient. (1960, 263)
The upshot is the following.
That all are adequate as explications of natural number means
that natural numbers, in any distinctive sense, do not need to be
reckoned into our universe in addition. (1960, 263)
Thus, every explication comes with ontological commitment—namely,
ontological commitment to sets. The explications just identify ‘numbers’
with certain sets in such a way that the background set theory proves
the existence of a progression, i.e., accounts for (NnPp).
Furthermore, Quine is explicit that the explication of ‘number’ also
means that we are not ontologically committed to numbers. As men-
tioned before, we are still free, though, to call the sets we used in the
explication ‘numbers’.
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6.2 Explication Example 2: Mind and Body
This brings us to the less clear case of mind. Quine introduces the topic
as follows.
That explication is elimination, and hence conversely that elim-
ination can often be allowed the gentler air of explication, is an
observation about a philosophical activity that far transcends the
philosophy of mathematics, even if the best examples are there.
Before we drop the topic, we may do well to note the bearing of
that observation on the philosophical issue over mind and body.
Let me lead up to the matter with a defense of physicalism. (1960,
264)
The main question Quine wants to address is the following.
Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory
of them? (1960, 265)
What Quine suggests in the first quotation is that some instances of elim-
ination might be made sense of in terms of explication. Of course, Quine
is explicit that not every elimination is an explication, but it is prefer-
able to attempt an explication where possible. Indeed, an explication
puts us into a position in which we can make sense of such notions which
otherwise would just be eliminated.
As Quine attempts an explication, he needs a background theory. In
the case at hand he identifies ‘physicalism’. The challenge is, then, to ac-
count for mental events and mental states in terms of ‘certain correlative
physiological states and events’ (1960, 264). In order to do so, we need
to find a purpose for mental events and states that is worth preserving
(1960, 264). If we cannot find a purpose worth preserving, we can just
eliminate the mental events and states and do with the non-mental: ‘The
bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?’ (1960, 264).
That this does not constitute a clear-cut case of explication, though,
is explained by the absence of an adequate paraphrase. Quine compares
the case to the Fregean explication of number which works because Frege
paraphrases the standard contexts of numerical expressions into
antecedently significant contexts of the corresponding expressions
for classes[.] (1960, 266)
Quine contrasts this with the case of mind as follows.
But when we explain mental states as bodily states, or eliminate
them in favor of bodily states, in the easy fashion here envisaged,
we do not paraphrase the standard contexts of the mental terms
into independently explained contexts of physical terms. (1960,
266, my emphasis)
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The difference between these two cases is the availability of a paraphrase.
In the case of the clear-cut explication, there is a paraphrase available.
Quine chooses to just discuss Frege’s definition, but it is clear that this
carries over to the other explications of number.
In case of mental terms, on the other hand, we are not in possession
of an explicit paraphrase. This does, of course, not mean that there is
no paraphrase. On the contrary, the adoption of physicalism implies that
we can account for everything in physical terms, i.e., that there is such
a paraphrase (otherwise physicalism would have counterexamples):
What may primarily be said in characterization of physicalism
[. . . ] is that it declares no unbridgeable differences in kind between
the mental and the physical. (1960, 265)
The conclusion Quine draws is that
the distinction between an eliminative and an explicative physi-
calism is unreal. (1960, 265)
It is unreal because an explicative physicalism is a physicalism which ex-
plicates the mental—and thereby eliminates it. And, if we have a system-
atic way of eliminating it, we can, likewise, understand the elimination
procedure as explicative because it would be in form of a paraphrase.18
However, we do not have such a paraphrase available, so that sentences
in mentalistic terms
merely come to be thought of as taking physicalistic rather than
mentalistic complements (1960, 266)
without providing an explicit set of instructions how to do so.
7 Non-Explication Examples
This brings us to examples which are not explications.19 Besides substan-
tiating my claim that (Example 2)–(Example 4) are not explications
(Section 7.3) we also are now in a position to diagnose why they might
be mistaken for explications.
7.1 Non-Explication Example 1: Limits
In W&O’s §51, Quine considers and dismisses several defective nouns.
The first example is infinitesimals, and the strategy to get rid of them is
applied to the other cases as ‘limit myths’.
18Gustafsson (2006) misses this because he misses the connection to paraphrase. I
also disagree with his assessment that Quine’s points are ‘applicable only to forms
of dualism that do not assume disembodied minds’ (2006, 65; cf. 2014, 521).
19Gustafsson (2014, 522) agrees that the following examples (Sections 7.1–7.2) are
not explications.
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Quine explains that the invention of the differential calculus came along
with the introduction of infinitesimals, even though ‘the idea of infinites-
imals was absurd’ (1960, 248). Nevertheless, such entities were necessary
for the differential calculus. Only the work of Cauchy and, especially,
Weierstraß made it possible to dispense with them:
The conflict was resolved byWeierstrass, who showed by his theory
of limits how the sentences of the differential calculus could be
systematically reconstrued so as to draw only on proper numbers
as values of the variables, without impairing the utility of the
calculus. (1960, 248)
Put differently, Weierstraß showed how to paraphrase these sentences.
Nevertheless, this is not a case of explication, because the paraphrase
also shows that the purpose of infinitesimals have been served already;
we don’t need something like a purpose postulate that needs to be proven
within the theory of limits. Indeed, we do not need to isolate anything
in this theory’s ontology to play the role of infinitesimals.
Quine’s strategy to dispense with other notions such as ideal objects
like mass points, frictionless surfaces, and isolated systems (1960, 249),
is the same as in the infinitesimal case, viz., he provides (Weierstraßian)
paraphrases. Quine explains their upshot as follows.
When we paraphrase our talk of ideal objects in the Weierstrassian
spirit [. . . ], we are merely switching from a theory that is conve-
niently simple in a short view and complex in a long view to a
theory of opposite character. (1960, 250)
What these paraphrases provide us with is simplicity in the long view
compared to other theories. The more complex theory ‘gets the inferior
rating of convenient myth’ (1960, 250), but, since such theories are simple
in the short view, paraphrases show us how to benefit from them.
7.2 Non-Explication Example 2: Geometrical
Objects
Quine also dispenses with geometrical notions such as points, curves,
surfaces, and solids (§52). Quine considers to use the same strategy
as ‘for the ideal objects of mechanics’ (1960, 252), i.e., a Weierstraßian
paraphrase, but notes that
it ill fits the existential statements of geometry (1960, 252)
which wouldn’t be properly paraphrased.
Moreover, contrasting this case with the former case of mass points,
Quine notes that ‘[n]o sense has been made of [the mass points’] date
and location’ (1960, 252), and, for date in particular, there ‘supervenes a
perplexity of identity’ (1960, 252). This means, then, that in the above
cases, we at least have defective notions, i.e., potential explicanda.
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On the other hand, geometrical objects raise no such evident prob-
lems of position or identity; they are positions outright. (1960,
252)
Thus, geometrical objects are not defective nouns and, therefore, cannot
be explicated in the first place.
The upshot is that this case has to be handled differently. Indeed,
Quine points out that the issue turns on
what theory will best systematize the data of physics. Thus we
may fairly say that the question of the nature of the geometri-
cal objects is, like the question of the nature of the elementary
particles of physics, a question of physical theory. (1960, 253)
No explication is necessary.
7.3 The Puzzle Cases
Let us finally consider why (Example 2)–(Example 4) are not instances
of explications and, more importantly, why they could be mistaken for
explications.
Recall that the examples are singular descriptions (Example 2), in-
dicative conditions (Example 3), and quantifiers (Example 4). Clearly,
none of them are nouns, so, in particular, none of them are defective
nouns. Furthermore, none of them come with ontological commitments
because we don’t need to find anything within our theory’s ontology to
identify them with. Lastly, there is no theory into which we explicate
them in the first place so that, even if we came up with purpose postu-
lates, they couldn’t be proven in the theory.
However, Quine does treat all of them by paraphrasing them. Different
uses of ‘paraphrase’ are at work, though. Furthermore, as part of natural
language, they can be taken to be defective—but, of course, in a different
sense of ‘defective’ than defective nouns are defective.
We can also note that these examples are cases of explication after
all—but of Carnapian explication. Since he takes his attitude towards
explication to be the same as Carnap’s (see Section 2.2), Quine might
have been thinking of Carnapian explication when taking (Example 2)–
(Example 4) to be explications. However, it should be clear that Quine’s
notion of explication is much narrower than Carnap’s;20 see Section 9.
8 Explication and Classes
As a last example of non-explication, let us consider classes. (I call them
here ‘classes’ and not ‘sets’.) Quine considers them explicitly in W&O’s
20Contrary to what Gustafsson claims, viz., that Carnap’s and Quine’s conceptions
are both ‘broad and loose enough to fit many of the same particular cases’ (2014,
509).
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§55 after his discussion of explication (§53) and explication examples
(§54).
As we noted in Sections 3.3 and 6.1, Quine assumes a theory of classes
in the background when explicating ‘ordered pair’ and ‘natural number’.
Indeed, his strategy to dispense with all sorts of notions and entities is
by paraphrasing them in terms of classes. This means, in particular, that
we cannot take classes as the outcome of an explication. However, the
case of classes illustrates an important use of explication, even though
Quine is not explicit about it.
The use is this. Explication or, rather, explicative power, is a criterion
for theory choice: a correct theory of the world must be able to explicate
every useful noun. Crucially, here, Quinean explication is not iterative,
because the explicandum has to be defective, but no explicatum could
be defective as part of a theory couched in canonical notation (cf. foot-
note 6). This means that we cannot try to further explicate those notions
which a theory is not capable of accounting for.
The explication test is quite simple. Consider a theory T . To test
whether T is a candidate for being a correct theory, take a useful notion
and see whether T explicates it. If T does not for all such notions, it is
not a correct theory.
Of course, being able to explicate all useful notions might not be
enough to be a correct theory, so that other considerations need to enter
the picture. Nevertheless, we can use the lack of explicative power of
theories to dismiss them.21
The above test is part of Quine’s argument for the adoption of a theory
of classes: it explicates all useful notions:
Classes can do the work of ordered pairs and hence also of relations
(§53), and they can do the work of natural numbers (§54). They
can do the work of the richer sorts of numbers too—rational, real,
complex; for these can be variously explicated on the basis of
natural numbers by suitable constructions of classes and relations.
Numerical functions, in turn, can be explicated as certain relations
of numbers. All in all the universe of classes leaves no further
objects to be desired for the whole of classical mathematics. (1960,
266f.)
Indeed, Quine gets close to explicitly stating the suggested test:
Intensional objects aside, the abstract objects that it is useful to
admit to the universe of discourse at all seem to be adequately
explicable in terms of a universe comprising just physical objects
and all classes of the objects in the universe (hence classes of
physical objects, classes of such classes, etc.). (1960, 267)
21That is also what Quine (1998b, 430f.) suggests: if physics is not capable of expli-
cating ‘telepathic effects’, assuming they have been properly established, then we
reject that version of physics and need to work on a new one.
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Thus, if a pure theory of classes does not provide us with everything we
need, we also need to add physical objects in order to explicate every-
thing of interest. (However, Quine 1976 seems to reduce even physical
objects to classes.) Also, Quine does not accept the usual theory of
classes because it overshoots its target, but endorses Gödel’s axiom of
constructibility (1992, §40, 1998a, 400). In order to see whether this the-
ory of classes is adequate, we have to see whether it is capable of carrying
out the explications:
Whether classes continue to do all the services claimed for them,
e.g. in foregoing pages and chapters, has then to be checked up
with an eye to the specific restricted theory adopted. (1960, 268)
When successful, we can keep the theory.
9 Conclusion
Let me conclude with a comparison. Both Quinean and Carnapian ex-
plication are two step processes. In the first step, we clarify the expli-
candum, and, in the second step, we propose an explicatum. Carnapian
M&N-explication often formulates conventions in the first step, whereas
Quinean explication comes with purpose postulates.
Quinean explication is theory-relative: given a theory T , an explication
finds T -surrogates in such way that T non-trivially proves the purpose
postulates. The ‘non-triviality’ requirement is implemented by T onto-
logically committing to the explicata. This might seem anti-Carnapian,
but I don’t think it is; Carnap (1950, 214, n. 3) recognises the role of
the variable and sees Quine and himself in agreement albeit taking um-
brage at Quine’s terminology (1950, 215, n. 5). Indeed, Carnap’s LFoP
requirement of an interpretation likewise prohibits the trivialization of
explications.
Nevertheless, Quinean is much narrower than Carnapian explication.
It exclusively relates expressions of natural language and expressions of
canonical notation. This also connects Quinean explication and para-
phrase: explication is a particular kind of paraphrase. The contrast be-
tween the number and the mind explications made this especially clear.
Nevertheless, Quinean explication plays no direct role in regimentation—
that’s the business of paraphrase.22 Only after the paraphrasing is done
and we have a theory Quinean explication enters: it is a criterion of the-
ory choice. If a theory does not explicate all useful nouns, it cannot be
adequate.23
This contrasts with Carnapian explication: Quinean explication is not
iterative, i.e., an explicatum can never serve as explicandum—but this is
22Explication is also not part of W&O’s ch. V entitled ‘Regimentation’.
23This is why explication is part of W&O’s ch. VII entitled ‘Ontic Decision’; for one’s
overall ontic decision to be adequate, it has to explicate everything useful.
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not the case for Carnapian explication. Carnapian explication is a much
broader notion—which Quine seems to use occasionally and mistake for
his own. One reason for this confusion is that Quinean explication is
paraphrase, and, as Table 1 makes obvious, the uses of ‘paraphrase’ are
vast. Distinguishing here makes the contrast between Carnapian and
Quinean explication clear, though: they serve different purposes. Carnap
wants to progress science, Quine wants to test the adequacy of theories.
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